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Abstract 
With the emergence of transnational corporations and the resulting 
internationalisation of union co-determination, unions are found to organise 
themselves ineffectively in order to deal with this development. This paper 
attempts to offer a preliminary explanation as to why unions organise 
themselves in any given way during corporate mergers. A major literature 
review as well as an in depth case study constitute the basis for the explanation 
provided in this paper. Our literature study identify five major ideals of union 
organising, shaping the ways in which unions organise themselves in order to 
maintain legitimacy. Our in depth case study reveal how these ideals come 
into play in practice and how actors in a union organising process (re)produce 
these ideals in resolving issues regarding organisational identity and 
governance. We integrate our findings in presenting a conceptual model of 
union organising within transnational corporations, highlighting the diverse 
interrelationship between ideals as well as between ideals and actors. 
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Explaining Union Organising During Corporate Mergers – 
A Case Study Of Nordea Union 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 20th century, unions have achieved a strong position not only towards corporations 
but also inside corporations. Through the different enforced acts of co-determination during the 
1970s, the unions’ role in corporate decision-making structures was established as well as 
formalised. One consequence of this development was the emergence of so called local union 
structures, that is formal union organisations at the corporate level as distinct from the 
traditional union organisations at the industry or national level. These local union structures are 
formally a part of some industry level union, however they often have an autonomous hierarchy. 
As local unions was expected to take an active part in the internal development of corporations, 
these developments can be expected to have an effect on the way local unions, and thus unions 
in general, organise. 
One major such form of corporate development is corporate mergers. By mergers we mean 
within the context of this paper ‘mergers-of-equals’. In the 20th century, the frequency of 
corporate mergers has increased. During the 1990s, the last and greatest of four so called 
merger waves during the 20th century took place with an annual merger volume in terms of 
capital value of around 1200 billion US dollars (Larsson & Wallentin, 2001). Corporate mergers 
are relevant to unions for a number of different reasons. Primarily though, mergers are often 
decided on with a purpose of realising economies of scale. This often involves significant cost 
reducing measures which more often than not means reducing the number of employees. 
In this context, questions arise whether or not local unions from the two different merging 
companies should cooperate during and after the corporate merger process. Cooperation is 
made difficult as the interests of the local unions involved may be mutually exclusive. One other 
factor making cooperation difficult appears during so called cross-border corporate mergers 
when cultural and institutional differences complicate negotiations. On the other hand, unions 
not cooperating may be played out against each other by the management, thereby loosing even 
more in terms of influence and subsequent benefits for its members.  
These issues have seldom been explored and even less so from an organisational perspective. An 
initial effort was made in a field study conducted during the spring of 2003 (Hyllman & 
Gunnarsson, 2005) of 14 cases of corporate mergers, focusing on how local unions organise 
themselves as a response to the corporate merger. As most of the studied cases involved cross-
border mergers, they can be seen as examples of a process of internationalisation. The studied 
cases consisted of all mergers between 1995 and 2002 with at least one Swedish part. In short, 
we found that in eleven (11) of the cases, union influence had been reduced as a result of the 
merger. In each of these cases, unions had chosen to organise themselves i) unilaterally, i.e. 
without any closer cooperation with other unions involved in the merger process, ii) locally, 
without any interaction with the central union to which it belonged, and iii) at strategic level, in 
other words without participating at the operative level of the corporate merger process. In the 
other three (3) cases, union influence had either been maintained or, in two of these cases, 
increased. In each of these three cases the unions had organised themselves multilaterally and at   3
an operative level. Two interesting implications followed from this study. First, it is clear that 
cooperation is beneficial to unions. Second, such cooperation seems unusual and consequently, 
that unions generally tend to organise themselves ineffectively as a response to corporate 
mergers in trying to manage the internationalisation of business and co-determination. As 
national and institutional differences were found insufficient to fully explain these findings, our 
study suggested that further studies were needed to explain why unions organise themselves in 
any given way during corporate mergers. This paper is an attempt to address this need. To do 
this, we construct a preliminary model of union organising based on a review of previous 
research. We later employ this model on a longitudinal case study of the union organising 
process within Nordea Union during 1997 and 2003. 
We chose our in depth case study based on a number of different criterias. First, we wanted it to 
be a successful case since we believed the learning potential to be greater from such a case. 
Second, we wanted it to be a cross-border merger as we would otherwise lose an important 
dimension of the union organising process. We decided upon Nordea Union, studying its 
organising process between 1997 and 2003. This means the case study was partially 
retrospective. The advantage of is being able to see outcomes and effects of decisions made as 
well as make room for more nuanced and thought-through reflections. The downsides include 
memory gaps, rationalisations as well as formation of “collective truths”. Overall, these 
downsides has to our judgment not been dominant in this case. Data was primarily collected 
through the use of semi-structured interviews. In total, 18 interviews was conducted with a 
broad spectrum of representatives within Nordea Union as well as within the management of 
Nordea. In addition to interviews, documents of different formats such as policy documents, 
annual statements, press releases and internet material was studied and used as empirical 
material. All data and case descriptions has been verified with representatives of Nordea Union. 
MASTER IDEAS ON UNION ORGANISING – A REVIEW OF PREVIOUS 
RESEARCH 
Assumptions and values, norms and beliefs are recurrent phenomena in every organisation. One 
way of labelling these is a collection of common, if sometimes contradictory, organising ideas 
(Hellgren & Löwstedt, 1997:49). This form of preconceptions usually demonstrate a significant 
degree of stability, some preconceptions are so stable that they resist proof that the underlying 
thought structure is flawed (Fiske & Taylor, 1984:171). Union representatives choices of 
organising strategies during corporate mergers appear as one possible example of this 
phenomenon. Every existing idea does not have the same impact on the organisation and its 
activities. In the interaction between the different ideas, some emerge as dominant and become 
guiding lights to the organisation. Normann (1975:30) call these “winning” ideas within a 
organisation dominant ideas. Another way of labelling these ideas is as master ideas. These ideas 
often become dominant in the public rhetoric within and outside the organisation and are thus 
able to influence peoples’ actions. 
As preconceptions are expressed in different ways and made a natural part of the rhetorical space 
within an organisation, they influence actual processes within organisation. This perspective 
carries the implicit notion that these preconceptions are perceived and interpreted in different 
ways by actors within the organisation (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996). As rhetorical resources,   4
these preconceptions allow themselves to be captured scientifically using discourse methodology 
(Berglund, 2002). Based on these propositions, we scanned a total number of 76 empirical 
research reports on union organising. We reviewed these studies with the purpose of mapping 
ideas on how unions “should be” organised. These categories of ideas were self generated in the 
sense that they emerged as blocks of text were classified. A text that could not be placed within 
an existing category led to the creation of a new category. The overall criteria for the 
classification was perceived similarity. In total, this review led to the forming of ten specific 
categories, of which five categories were the significantly largest counting the number of 
included research reports. We regard these five categories as candidates for master ideas on 
union organising. They are presented in figure 1 below and form our preliminary model on 
union organising during corporate mergers. 
A common feature of these master ideas is that they each add or reduce legitimacy to any given 
form of union organising. An organisation not adhering to the idea of “democracy” will appear as 
illegitimate to most of its stakeholders the same way that an organisation not perceived to be 
“efficient” will lose legitimacy as it does not appear to be accomplishing anything. If the union 
does not correspond to the idea of “policy”, the union will have problems of legitimacy towards 
the central union of which it is a member. On the other hand, if the unions does not reflect the 
idea of the “corporation”, it will be regarded as less legitimate by the corporate management 
thereby reducing their ability to exert influence. In these ways, these master ideas can be said to 
express stakeholders’ and the environment’s expectations and restrictions on the unions and the 
ways in which the unions choose to organise. 
Dominating Ideal:  Frequency:  Example of references: 
"Democracy". Unions organize themselves in any given way in order 
to best protect its members' rights and views and guarantee that its 





"Policy". Unions organize themselves in any given way because it 
corresponds to the organization's political purpose and its role as a 
part of a larger union movement. 
22 
Berg & Jonsson (1991) 
Ramsay (1997) 
Galenson (1999) 
"Efficiency". Unions organize themselves in any given way because it 
is perceivably the best and quickest way in which the union can 




Eriksson m fl (2002) 
"Nation". Unions organize themselves in any given way to adopt to 





Weston & Lucio (1997) 
"Corporation". Unions organize themselves in any given way to 
reflect the corporate structure in order to maintain flexibility as 
well as bargaining space and decision-making authority at a local 
level. 
14 
Haworth & Ramsay (1984) 
Elvander (1995) 
Wills (1998) 
Figure 1: Dominating Ideals of Union Organizing 
 
It is however difficult to say anything more substantial regarding these master ideas’ significance 
in a localised context. One reason for this is that the ideas themselves are not objective entities, 
rather they are interpreted and used within the local context and are thereby “given” a certain 
meaning. Likewise, the existence of these ideas does not rule out organisational choice. There   5
are any number of ways in which it is possible to fulfill the idea of “efficiency”, for example. 
Also, we know nothing of any possible interrelations between these five master ideas. Are they 
complementary or substitutional of each other? Is there any specific hierarchy between them? To 
sort out these issues, we chose to look closer on one specific case of union organising: Nordea 
Union’s organising process between 1997 and 2003 as a result of the four mergers leading to the 
creation of the Nordic financial actor Nordea. 
THE DREAM OF A NORDIC UNION – THE CREATION OF NORDEA UNION 
The first building block in the construction of the Nordic financial group Nordea was put in 
place in 1997 with the merger between Finnish Merita and Swedish Nordbanken, forming the 
finnish-owned company of MeritaNordbanken. During 2000, the last two building blocks, 
Danish Unibank and Norwegian Kreditkassen, was added. The dream of a Nordic bank had been 
launched in the middle of the 1990’s by the then chairman of Nordbanken, Jacob Palmstierna 
along with Nordbanken’s CEO at the time, Hans Dalborg. As the bank’s top management 
dreamed of a nordic bank, the premier union representative within Nordbanken dreamt about 
the creation of a Nordic union within Nordea. 
Within Nordea, there exist mainly four local unions, each representing one of the four banks 
and each being clubs within a respective national trade union. We will for practical reasons label 
these local unions Nordbanken Union, Merita Union, Unibank Union and Kreditkassen Union. 
The emerging union organisation will during the first stage of the merger process be called 
MeritaNordbanken Union and subsequently, in the latter stages, Nordea Union. 
The First Wave (1997-2000) 
The first wave of the merger process started with the decision to merge Finnish Merita and 
Swedish Nordbanken. The new company, MeritaNordbanken, was registered in Finland and it 
was therefore not obvious that the unions would retain their right of board representation. Even 
so, it was decided to keep the unions on the board as the alternative would mean, in the words 
of one top manager: “putting the first nail in the merger’s coffin”. The representatives of Merita 
Union and Nordbanken Union met early in order to get to know each other and to discuss 
potential collaboration. These contacts were facilitated by already established personal relations 
between the two organisations through the Confederation of the Nordic Bank, Finance and 
Insurance Unions (NFU), a Nordic umbrella organisation for the national unions within the 
finance and insurance industries. 
The general perception of the merger was that it was relatively unproblematic from a union 
perspective since it involved two banks from different countries. This perception was based on 
the idea of the “nation” as a natural form of differentiation between the different parts of the 
bank, which was enhanced by the bank’s limited view so far that market coverage was more 
important than realising cost synergies through increased coordination. The result of this first 
meeting was a decision to share the formal rights of union representation on the board between 
Merita Union and Nordbanken Union.    6
Apart from this, more elaborate forms av union collaboration was discussed. Three alternatives 
for union organising and collaboration was presented. In a declining degree of ambition and 
integration, these alternatives proposed the initiation of a Nordic co-determination agreement, a 
joint group council and the establishment of a so called ‘european works council’ (EWC). The 
decision was to form a joint group council for the exchange of information and consultation 
together with the Group management. Simultaneously, it was decided to start an informal 
forum for dialogue between the two unions prior to the meetings in the Group council. This was 
a first seed in the creation of MeritaNordbanken Union. One possible reason for choosing this 
alternative and not a more integrated form was that the company’s integration was not very far 
gone. One other possible reason was that doubts towards a nordic co-determination agreement 
instead of national agreements was based on a will to keep bargaining rights at a national level. In 
this way, we are able to see how a set of ideas based on the preconception about the “nation” is a 
focal point of union organising. 
During 1999, a research project financed by NFU was finished, titled ”Co-determination and 
union influence in pan-nordic financial groups” (Byrkjeland, 2000). In the report, it is confirmed 
that: 
”…in the short run it should be the ambition to create formalised and continuous collaboration 
between national unions. This is the basis between pan-national systems of co-determination and a 
precondition for effective action towards group managements. /…/ A minimum requirement should 
be the creation of a pan-national task force with a reasonable number of meetings and staff.” 
Based on this report, NFU recommends the formation of so called nordic task forces. This is 
done by refering to the idea of “efficiency”, it is argued that the current nordic union organising is 
insufficient to maintain a desired level of influence towards the companies. In discussion with 
the union representatives within MeritaNordbanken Union, it is agreed to form such a nordic 
task force. In reality, this means formalising the already existing informal dialogue forum 
established between Merita Union and Nordbanken Union. The task force is the first formal step 
towards what would later be Nordea Union Board (NUB). NFU makes one substantial 
amendment to the recommendations presented in the research report: they establish themselves 
as a part of this task force. As NFU is an umbrella organisation for the national unions, this could 
be seen as an expression of the idea of “policy”, where the national unions attempt to increase 
their position within MeritaNordbanken Union’s organising process. The introduction of task 
forces at NFU’s initiative and with NFU participation is also a way of claiming the position of the 
national union in a process leading away from national structures. This way it is illustrated how 
the idea of the “nation” is circling in the background. 
The Second Wave (2000-2003) 
During 2000, both Unibank and Kreditkassen became a part of Nordea. Likewise, Unibank 
Union and Kreditkassen Union became fullfledged members of the local union Nordea Union, 
albeit at different points in time. Unibank Union entered Nordea Union at the beginning of the 
year while Kreditkassen Union joined later due to a slow and somewhat tempestuous political 
process. The principle of shared board representation remained, thus keeping the dream of a 
nordic union.   7
Unibank Union brought a somewhat different union perspective to Nordea Union, a perspective 
that to a larger degree focused on business objectives and on the ”corporation” as idea, more 
clearly identifying with the survival and development of the company rather than the union 
movement as such. This is initially developed by a management representative, while the 
difference in perspectives is subsequently explained by a Swedish union representative with 
national differences, i.e. differences related to the idea of the “nation”. 
”One could use a metaphor and talk about the new bank and the old bank. The union is very much the 
old bank. At least in Sweden. It is a big difference in Denmark. They have a more business oriented 
view. Our survival depends upon this company. Not our collective political orientation.” 
”Denmark is to a high degree characterised by their history as a nation of trade whereas Sweden 
traditionally is an industrial nation. [Unibank Union] is also in their union work more focused on 
what they call the business objectives, they are more company oriented in that regard.” 
The first short-term effect on the union organisation due to the entrance of Unibank Union was 
a formalisation of existing structures and processes. Among other things, the former task force 
was now formalised into Nordea Union Board with three representatives from each country. 
New demands was placed on the Group council established in collaboration with the company 
management. These demands included specific guidelines for meeting procedures as well as an 
evolution from being forum for exchange of information to conducting negotiations to a larger 
degree. Discussions was also initiated regarding the start of a pan-nordic negotiating body at the 
business area level, a project labelled ‘consultative committees’. Put together, this development 
started raising demands for a more formalised and executive organisation within Nordea Union. 
At approximately the same point in time, about mid-2000, the Structure Committee, a task 
force within NFU consisting of representatives from each national union, presented their 
findings. The Committee had been initiated at the end of 1999 in order to further discuss the 
need for guidelines for elected officials in Nordic groups. Starting from Byrkjelands research 
report, the formation of so called “task forces” was again recommended. It was also suggested 
that this system was “expanded and developed in close interaction with NFU, the national unions 
and elected officials in different local unions”. Due to slow organisational processes, Nordea 
Union had earlier removed NFU and the national unions from their internal task force. The 
Committee here chooses to express a concern that the local union organising in different groups, 
with a clear hint at Nordea, does not take place in close enough interaction with NFU. This way, 
the Committee gives voice to the opinion that the ever stronger ideal of the “corporation” does 
not conform to a maintained ideal of “policy”. 
As the company during 2001 started what was called a ”second wave of integration”, meaning 
attempts to start realising cost synergies and economies of scale to a higher degree, new 
demands were put on the union organisation. An observable action during this period was to 
realise the idea about so called ‘consultative committees’. The objective was to be able to 
achieve coordinated negotiations across national borders and avoid destabilising negotiations in 
several countries at the same time. Another objective was to allocate negotiating rights as close 
to the actual business as possible and also to involve union officials at lower levels within Nordea 
Union. Although it was perceived as a necessity for Nordea Union to organise themselves in this 
way, it was noted that it created a rift between the “Nordic at central level and the national at 
local level” as one representative of the top management put it. Again, the emerging contrast 
between the ideas of “corporation” and “policy” is highlighted as a very real problem. The fact that   8
the idea of ‘consultative committees’ was still realised can be understood by observing its link to 
two other ideas: “democracy” and “efficiency”. ‘Consultative committees’ was motivated both as 
being a tool for a more effective union organisation as well as being a democratic tool with 
which Nordea Union, based on an idea of “corporation”, could close the distance to its members 
and involve these in the Nordic organising process. In basing ‘consultative committees’ on these 
ideas, the project is given a more solid base than what would have been the case if only one idea 
were used. In the words of one union representative who participated as a member of three such 
‘consultative committees’: 
”I don’t know from where the idea of consultative committees came, but since the bank is divided into 
business areas we needed to match their organisation. Besides, consultative committees works fine, 
they fulfill a democratic function.” 
A second committee linked to NFU, the ”New Structure Committee”, wraps up their work at 
the end of 2001. With a similar composition as its predecessor, this new Committee discusses 
the effects of the Nordic local union development within the financial sector. It is noted that the 
development within different local unions vary and that some, by which Nordea Union is clearly 
implied, does not “feel the need of union experts participating in the local union’s work but 
would rather do the job themselves”. The New Structure Committee also notes that it would be 
in the local unions’ own interest to gain access to the national unions’ expertise but also that it is 
in the: 
”…national unions interest to maintain contact with the local unions in order for these to not become 
too independent and large leading to a weakened solidarity within the national unions. /…/ The 
Committee recommends that one person from one of the NFU union’s central offices is tied to each 
local union. /…/ It is important to clarify the function and role of these persons.” 
This statement from the final report of NFU’s New Structure Committee thus explicitly notes 
the emerging contradiction between the two ideas ”policy” and “corporation”. The recommended 
method by the Committee in order to balance this development towards the idea of “policy” is to 
repeat the earlier Structure Committee’s recommendation of national union representatives in 
the local unions. The role and function of these representatives is not clarified this time either. 
During 2002, the fast paced development in Nordea leads to a suggested organisational reform 
within Nordea Union. This proposal is designed and presented by representatives of Unibank 
Union and contains two main points: 1) a formalisation of NUB, and 2) the creation of a 
common, single union spokesperson within Nordea Union. A basic idea was also to establish 
formal routines for how the pan-nordic organisation was meant to work in order to enable the 
creation of trust among the different parties. The reform was mainly motivated with arguments 
centered around the idea of “efficiency”. The intention was to make it clear to the company that 
they were negotiating with one union and to communicate a more unified approach and to signal 
more collective strength than what had previously been the case. 
The controversial part of the suggested reform was the creation of a Nordic spokesperson. The 
arguments based on “efficiency” that was being used to support the reform was met by arguments 
based on the idea of “democracy” and, more indirectly, on the idea of the “nation”. It was said that 
the creation of a single spokesperson would lead to Nordea Union “loosing touch with its 
members” and that too much focus would be placed upon one person. In conjunction with this, a 
maintained connection to the national union was construed as a gurantee for a preserved contact   9
with the members. As one Swedish union representative summarised the thoughts surrounding 
the proposal: 
”There were many doubts about the Danish proposal. There was a risk that we would end up farther 
away from our members and for our national organisations to end up in the backwater. There is a risk 
of us over-organising ourselves and there were also critical voices about the suggested ‘steering 
committee’. The idea of a spokesperson was rejected. It was too much focus on one person. It is not a 
necessary focus. All four [local union chairmen] must be able to represent the organisation.” 
In spite of democratically based arguments, the perceived need to further coordinate activities 
within Nordea Union remained. Among the alternatives of letting NUB be the coordinating 
forum and electing a Nordic spokesperson, a third route was chosen as a compromise: the 
creation of a so called ‘steering committee’. This forum consisted of the four national local 
union chairmen and practically formalised an executive committee within NUB. 
’Steering committee’ struck a balance between arguments based on either ”efficiency” or 
“democracy”. This did not eliminate criticism regarding this construction, in fact based on both of 
these ideas. Those who for democratic reasons rejected the idea of a Nordic spokesperson were 
for similar reasons critical towards a ‘steering committee’ as it implied an additional 
organisational level above NUB. Those who had argued for a Nordic spokesperson viewed a 
‘steering committee’ as a less effective as well as less democratic solution. According to them, 
the formalisation of a ‘steering committee’ led to decisions being transferred away from the 
elected officials within NUB to the smaller circle of people within the ‘steering committee’, 
making its mandate unclear. This discussion shows how different actors constructs a given idea, 
“democracy”, in fundamentally different ways. Where some people constructs “democracy” based 
on which organisational level to which influence is centered and equates democracy with direct 
participation, others, illustrated by the Danish position, view “democracy” as manifested in the 
formal routines and processes that defines the relationship between various constituents within 
an organisation. In the case, these differences lead the proposition of a spokesperson to being 
viewed by some actors as democratic while at the same time being viewed as undemocratic by 
other actors. The same thing is the case for the idea of a ‘steering committee’. Though never 
explicitly addressed, these differences can clearly be derived from national differences and the 
idea of the “nation” therefore exists as a silent, obvious explanation for these different ways of 
looking at for example “democracy”. Swedes and Norwegians work with somewhat different 
definitions while Danes work with yet another. Finns on the other hand, seem to work with a 
much different definition, however this one does not come into play much in the Nordea Union 
organising process. 
The general development thus far, up until the New Year of 2002/03, had led to an ever more 
evolved and integrated organisation within Nordea Union. Starting out as a fundamentally 
federative structure, the organisation had been “stitched together” more and more through for 
example ‘consultative committees’ as the “seams” between the national structures. This 
development was accentuated by an increasing contradiction between the ideas of “corporation” 
and “policy” as basic ideals for union organising within Nordea Union. Likewise, the organising 
process led to a contradiction regarding the governance and control of the organisation, a 
contradiction starting in the two ideas of “democracy” and “efficiency”. Behind all these ideas, the 
idea about the “nation” emerges as important to the balancing of these sets of ideas. The unity 
was limited and Nordea Union needed to examine and evaluate their options for the future.   10
The Third Wave (2003 and onwards…) 
In order to define possible future actions a strategic task force was appointed at the end of 2002 
with the name of ”One Company – One Union”. The task force consisted of representatives of 
the national unions as well as NFU, with one representative from Nordea Union. The task force 
was assigned to evaluate and discuss three main future options for Nordea Union’s organisation: 
i) continue with national unions without a Nordic level, ii) the creation of a formal Nordic 
umbrella organisation, and iii) the creation of an independent Nordic union within Nordea 
Union. The two latter options implies the maintaining of Nordea Union, however with 
significantly different degrees of integration and independence. 
The task force presented its results at the end of the summer of 2003. In its report, the group 
presented their picture of the vision of “One Union” and gave it a number of characteristics. A 
list of these include “protecting the interests of the members“, “strategic thinking”, “adequate 
competence”, “appropriate decision-making structure”, “being decisive”, “democratically 
anchored”, “an inclusive organisation”, as well as “a flexible organisation”. All these values relate 
to some of the basic ideas of “democracy” or “efficiency”. These values are thereafter used as 
arguments to step-by-step eliminate one of the three identified options. Arguments relating to 
“efficiency” – “strategic thinking”, “adequate competence”, “decision-making structure”, “being 
decisive”, and “flexibility” – are used to eliminate the first option of national unions. The 
elimination of this alternative takes place in the first paragraph of the task force’s report. In the 
choice between the two remaining options, a Nordic umbrella organisation or an independent 
Nordic union, the task force employs arguments relating to the idea of “democracy” – “protecting 
members’ interests”, “democratically anchored” and “an inclusive organisation” – to position its 
recommendations. 
“A precondition for a successful establishment of ‘One Union’ is for the various union officials to 
acknowledge, understand and respect the cultures and traditions of the different countries. /…/ To 
ensure proper anchoring among the members the union officials should take their time. The 
development of ’One Union’ requires political maturity.” 
The quote illustrates how the task force uses the idea of ”democracy” to prevent an according to 
them to far-reaching union integration in the short term. They claim that the thought needs 
political maturity and should thus be decided at an undecided future point in time. This in 
conjunction with a clearly formulated preference for the second alternative, a Nordic umbrella 
organisation, and against the creation of an independent Nordic union. 
”In the short run the task force do not feel that the creation of ’One Union’ as an independent legal 
entity is desirable. The important thing at this stage is to act as a cohesive unit to retain influence at a 
strategic level across national borders. In the task force’s opinion, this means a mandate that enables 
the union officials to enter into a dialogue with the management and make binding decisions on behalf 
of all members in Nordea at a strategic and Nordic level.” 
The creation of an independent Nordic union and its subsequent break from the national union 
structure is contradictory to the interests of the union movement and entails a break against the 
idea of ”policy”, and the underlying idea of the “nation”. It is possible that this led to the task 
force’s strong statement against such a development where the issue no longer is to identify 
opportunities and solutions. Instead a relatively impressive list of problems and “threats” is 
constructed. The creation of an independent Nordic union is clearly described in terms of 
competition with the national unions and it’s reasonable to wonder whether all possibilities of   11
co-existence and collaboration was identified and evaluated to the same extent as the identified 
obstacles. 
”Should the union officials in Nordea choose to abandon the national unions the risk of an 
organisational fight is very high. The probability that the national unions would ’voluntarily’ 
surrender a significant number of its members is low. In the event of an organisational fight the 
national unions would likely prevent its members from joining ’One Union’ och prevent its 
membership in central organisations such as NFU and UNI. /…/ ‘One Union’ would need to perform 
all the tasks and offer all the services that are now offered by the national unions and their 
organisations.” 
The task force’s final recommendation was the second alternative, the creation of the joint 
Nordic umbrella organisation of ’Nordea Union’. This basically meant the same degree of 
integration that Nordea Union had already achieved, albeit with some updates. Among other 
things the introduction of a Nordic spokesperson was now recommended, something that 
shortly thereafter was implemented. Simultaneously the Nordic unit’s mandate was clarified and 
enhanced compared with before. Although the development did not proceed as far as creating an 
independent Nordic union, the third wave of integration brought with it an increased degree of 
integration within Nordea Union. 
The recommendations of the task force came as no surprise to the union officials within Nordea 
Union. That the recommendation would be the middle alternative was expected since it was the 
compromise between two extremes. In hindsight, several representatives states the “nation” and 
national differences as an important reason why it is unlikely that a more independent Nordic 
solution would emerge as a realistic alternative. It is noted that several national institutions such 
as labor laws are important to union organising and others mean that national ways of thinking 
and working still influence much of the union’s activities. Another highlighted argument was the 
importance of preserving the country’s uniqueness in relation to the Nordic organisation. A 
preservation of national structures is also presented as a necessity to maintain the proximity to 
the members. 
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR UNION ORGANISING IN TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 
In our case study of Nordea Union we see our five identified dominating organising ideals (see 
figure 1) of union organisation emerge empirically. That gives us some support for the claim that 
these dominating ideas are actual recurring phenomenon that union officials face in union 
organising processes within transnational corporations. This gives us reason to move on and try 
to develop this preliminary framework with the help of our case study within Nordea Union. 
The Ideas’ Status and Interaction 
One way of developing our preliminary framework is to highlight the interaction that emerges 
among the different ideas within the organising process of Nordea Union. Earlier we discussed 
the possibility that these ideas did not exist independent of each other. Our conclusions now 
lead us to return to this discussion.   12
A first dimension is constituted by the two ideas of ”democracy” and “efficiency”. The issues 
activating these ideas within Nordea Union usually expresses themselves in the form of 
discussions related to governance and control of the organisation and this dimension could 
therefore be characterised as a governance dimension. Relevant questions along this dimension is 
related to the main question of how to manage, control and coordinate union activities. Along 
this dimension the union need to find a balance between organising itself democratically as well 
as effectively. Empirically, this dimension emerges during a number of occasions. Every 
suggested organisational reform  presented during Nordea Union’s organising process – the 
creation of a task force, formalising NUB, proposing a Nordic spokesperson, ‘steering 
committee’, ‘consultative committees’, ‘One Union’ and so on – was characterised in terms of 
“democracy” or “efficiency”. This contradiction was made explicit a number of times by our 
respondents. We find extensive support for this dimension in previous research (compare with 
for example Jobring, 1980; Utbult, 1991; Swartz, 1994 and Chaison, 1997). It is therefore 
reasonable to designate the general validity of this dimension as reasonably high. 
A second dimension is construed by the ideas of ”policy” and “corporation”. Along this dimension, 
questions of the union’s identity is primarily made relevant and this dimension could thus be 
labelled an identity dimension. These dimension asks questions to union officials such as “who are 
we?” and “what is our purpose?”. Along this dimension, the union can choose to identify with the 
union movement, “policy”, or identify itself as a more or less independent organisation that 
protects the interests of the employees being members in the local union, “corporation”. In real 
life, a balance between these two ideals are presupposed. We find much empirical support for 
this dimension in our case study of Nordea Union. Especially in policy documents within the 
national unions and NFU how a developed and too independent company oriented local union 
structure could threaten the overall solidarity within the union movement. The task force “One 
Company – One Union” as well paints a clear picture in its report of such a conflict between 
these two ideals. Previous research does not provide much support for such a relationship, while 
on the other hand not providing any specific evidence against it. Some studies (Wills, 1998; 
2002) discuss how the evolution of corporations lead to a decoupling from national union 
structures to more company oriented union structures (Northrup & Rowan, 1979; Hawort & 
Ramsay, 1984). One possible conclusion would be that this relationship is a relatively new 
phenomenon that emerges as a consequence of the growth in the number of transnational 
corporations. This would highlight a specific contribution to the body of knowledge from our 
study. Another perhaps more cautious conclusion would be that this relationship should be 
viewed as more preliminary than the previous relationship. 
A more multi-faceted relationship emerges between the ideal of the ”nation” and other ideals 
within our preliminary framework. As an ideal, it does not seem to have a direct relationship 
with any specific other ideal but rather seem to be a precondition of every other ideal. 
Empirically, our case study reveal the ideal of “nation” as having a great significance for how 
actors in our study perceive what is consistent with “democracy” as well as “efficiency” and the 
opportunities and restrictions they see in the creation of a transnational/Nordic organisation 
model. We also show empirically  how national legislation and national structures directly and 
indirectly shape the actors’ preunderstanding of how unions should and could be organised. For 
example, Unibank Union is consistently described as more company oriented than other unions, 
more closely corresponding to the ideal of “corporation”. Previous research provides strong   13
support for the importance of the ideal of the “nation” (see for example IDE, 1980; Turner, 
1991; Sverke, 1997 and Piazza, 2002). 
A Conceptual Model – Introducing an Actor Perspective 
In the conceptual model below, the various dimensions are integrated into an explanatory 
framework for union organising in transnational corporations. “Policy” and “corporation” is 
organised along an identity dimension while “democracy” and “efficiency” is organised along a 
governance dimension. A legitimate union organisation has struck a good balance along both 
these dimensions. These dimensions can be used strategically by actors in order to support or 
reject a specific model of organisation. These dimensions rest upon and gains substance from a 
nationally based idea that we choose to call for “nation”. 
Through our study of Nordea Union’s organising process we have been able to develop our 
insight into how these dominating ideals are interpreted and applied by important actors in a 
union organising process. One important analytical conclusion from this study would be the 
necessity to add an actor perspective to these dominating ideals. By this we simply mean an 
understanding that these ideals, that can be regarded as structures, does not exist independently 











Figure 2: A Conceptual Model for Union Organising in Transnational 
Corporations 
For example, Nordea Union’s organising process demonstrates how one dominating idea can be 
given different and sometimes contradictory meanings by different actors. One example of this 
is the arguments surrounding the proposal to introduce a Nordic spokesperson based on the idea 
of “democracy” where some viewed a spokesperson as an undemocratic idea while some viewed it 
as a more democratic idea than what became the outcome, a ‘steering commmittee’. We also 


























”Nation”   14
temporal and situational context. The very same actors who opposed a spokesperson at a Nordic 
level did not question the need for having a spokesperson at a national level. Actors also use the 
ideals strategically in its argumentation for or against a certain organisational model, clearly 
demonstrated in the “One Company – One Union” task force’s report where the ideas of 
“democracy” and “efficiency” are used highly intentionally to reject or support various alternatives 
of organisation. We also see how different actors use the same ideal to argue for or against a 
specific form of organisation, exemplified by the argumentation concerning the so called 
‘consultative committees’ where national differences were argued to necessitate this way of 
organising while at the same time being used as reasons for why this way of organising could 
never work in the first place. The conclusion is therefore that these ideals are given shape and 
substance in a process of social construction which is enacted interactively between a given set of 
actors. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
One important trait of the conceptual model is its perspective on union organising as a process. 
It is not meant to contribute with any “right answer” as to how a union should organise itself. 
We view this model as a conceptual tool with which the shaping of a strategic process within 
unions is facilitated. By using our conceptual model, actors in a union organising process is given 
opportunities to position themselves as well as their co-actors. It thus becomes a tool for 
mapping organisational values, patterns of thought and other distinctive features of any given 
organisation, thereby enhancing a shared understanding between different union officials within 
a transnational corporation. The model also helps to explain how come unions organise 
themselves in a given way during corporate mergers, which was this essay’s initial research 
question as we were able to demonstrate in the previous essay that unions organise themselves 
inefficiently during corporate mergers. Any choice of union organisation during corporate 
mergers would depend upon the participating unions’ position within our model. Inefficient 
ways of organising, i.e. unilateral forms of organising, would suggest incommensurable or non-
negotiated differences in the positions of the participating unions within our framework. 
The model could easily be criticised for running the risk of reproducing rather than reducing a 
dichotomised way of thinking that would impair rather than facilitate a union organising process. 
One central conclusion is that unions need to balance all organisational ideals in order to keep 
their legitimacy. A union thus needs to organise itself democratically as well as effectively, 
against the corporation as well as against the union movement. In this perspective, a union is a 
multirational organisation. Our model aims to make these dichotomies visible and thereby 
increase the awareness of them. By this, we believe that the dichotomies are more likely to be 
problematised than what is the case today when they are allowed to exist in hiding. To what 
extent the model reproduced a polarised way of thinking is to a higher degree dependent on 
how one chooses to apply the model rather than on the model itself. 
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